In addition to accomplishing traditional objectives, repurchases of stock may serve to hedge existing shareholders' price risk exposure associated with future expected obligations to make shares available to employees exercising stock options. This paper analyzes such a possibility by exploring the relation between repurchases and stock option grants. For a sample of firms that, on average, are active repurchasers, I document an economically significant relation between option grants and repurchases, after controlling for other possible effects. Firms that are more likely hedging option grant price risk exposure by repurchasing stock are larger, have lower leverage ratios, and spend more on research and development. Overall, the results suggest that repurchasing stock in conjunction with granting options may be indicative of optimal hedging as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993 
stock option programs affect equity repurchase decisions. 1 The principal hypotheses underlying the relation between options and repurchases are 1) that repurchases alleviate dilution of earnings per share (e.g., Bens et al. (2003) and Weisbenner (2000) ), 2) that repurchases are used to "fund" stock option programs (e.g., Kahle (2002) ), and 3) that executive options increase incentives to substitute repurchases for dividends as a form of payout (e.g., Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002) ).
In this paper, I explore another possible rationale for the relation between stock repurchases and employee options. In the U.S., stock options granted to employees may be exercised at any time between the vesting and expiration dates of the options. At the date of option grant, there exists considerable uncertainty regarding the underlying stock price at the time of exercise. 2 Shareholders incur an opportunity cost when options are exercised because the employee buys shares of stock at the exercise price, as opposed to the current market price. The firm may protect its shareholders from the uncertainty surrounding this opportunity cost by repurchasing shares at the time of option grant.
Because employee stock options are typically granted at the money, the firm may buy shares, and later sell these shares to employees at the exercise price (which is equivalent to the market price at the grant date). In principle, such a hedge is roughly equivalent to the forward purchase of commodities or currencies, as practiced by many firms.
The principal implication of the hedging rationale for stock repurchases is that, within firms, option grants should be positively related to repurchase activity. The first The analysis suggests that employee option grants are positively related to contemporaneous stock repurchases in firm fixed effects models. While the statistical significance of this relation is not overly strong (p-values are typically in the 0.05 -0.10 range) for the full sample of firms, I find evidence that many firms exhibit economically significant relations between option grants and stock repurchases over time.
Given that a positive relation is documented between option grants and stock repurchases, a possible explanation is that stock repurchases serve as a hedging mechanism. I employ two different mechanisms to identify sets of firms for which option grants are positively related to stock repurchases. I find evidence using these measures that firms repurchasing stock in conjunction with option grants have less financial leverage. Combining this finding with the result that option grant hedging firms exhibit greater R&D expenditures provides support that these firms use this hedging technique to preserve internal capital to support spending on growth opportunities as in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) .
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on prior research examining the link between stock repurchases and options. The discussion in Section III provides a review of the uncertainty introduced by option grants, and how theories of optimal hedging may be related to this uncertainty. In Section IV, the option and 2 There also exists the possibility that options expire out of the money. Murphy (2002) reports that typical 10-year options expire in the money more than 80% of the time.
repurchase data are introduced. Section V provides analyses to address whether corporate stock repurchases are related to option grants. Section VI explores whether the relation between repurchases and option grants may be explained by theories of optimal risk management. Section VII provides concluding comments.
II. Literature on Repurchases and Stock Options
Until recently, the lack of data on employee and executive stock options made it difficult for researchers to study the link between options and stock repurchases. Recent work illustrates that stock options provide significant explanations for repurchase activity. Weisbenner (2000) provides initial evidence on the link between options and repurchases. In a cross-sectional regression using 1995 data on repurchases, he illustrates that employee options outstanding are positively related to repurchases.
Using Execucomp data during 1993 -1997 , Fenn and Liang (2001 find that executive options outstanding are positively related to repurchases. While their results are seemingly consistent with the hypothesis that option-holding managers prefer to substitute repurchases for dividends, it is not possible to rule out other option-related explanations given they do not use broad-based employee options in their analysis.
Kahle (2002) Kahle's study also incorporates executive options. She finds that executive options outstanding are positively related to the decision to repurchase, but do not affect repurchase activity. Thus, she concludes that managers use repurchases as a substitute form of payout to maximize the value of their options. Bens et al. (2003) focus their examination on the hypothesis that firms repurchase shares in amounts that allow for maintenance of EPS growth. Their sample consists of a panel of large firms during 1996 -1999. They find that the change in diluted shares occurring because of stock price effects on existing unexercised options has a positive impact on the number of shares repurchased. They also control for the dilutive effect of newly granted options, but find no relation between dilution from newly granted options and repurchases. They also document a positive relation between executive options outstanding and repurchases.
This paper adds to prior literature on three dimensions. First, this paper is the first to study whether option grants and repurchases are related. With the exception of Bens et al. (2003) , the aforementioned papers focus on the relation between repurchases and options outstanding to test their hypotheses. While Bens et al. (2003) possess data on option grants, they do not include this variable as a possible explanatory factor of repurchases. Instead, they construct a variable measuring the dilutive impact of option grants, and find that this variable offers no power in explaining repurchases. 4 are positively related to repurchases. 4 They disclose that the correlation between this "grant dilution" variable and option grants is 36%.
The second innovation from this study is that it incorporates the time-series of sample firms' repurchases and option grants into the analysis by allowing for within-firm effects in the statistical testing. I find that such a model choice is warranted from statistical evidence, and that the results differ significantly if these effects are ignored.
Prior studies, even those with panel data, rely on econometric specifications that do not account for firm fixed effects. A further discussion of econometric issues is included in Section IV.
Finally, this research provides a preliminary analysis as to whether commonly cited hedging rationales may account for the observed relation between option grants and repurchases within firms. The findings suggest that the underinvestment costs model of Froot et al. (1993) is useful in explaining a hedging rationale for the relation between option grants and stock repurchases.
III. Option Grants and Hedging as a Possible Motivation for Repurchases

A. Sources of Uncertainty Surrounding Option Grants and the Benefits of Hedging
Granting employee and executive stock options creates an uncertain obligation to award shares in the future. Three forms of uncertainty exist at the date of option grant.
First, the number of shares to be issued at the exercise price is unknown at the grant date.
However, the number of shares is bounded above by the total options granted. Thus, the potential obligation to issue shares falls in the range [0,N] , where N is the number of options granted. Quantity uncertainty may be addressed by hedging with nonlinear instruments (i.e., options) as discussed by Brown and Toft (2002) . Stock repurchases are a linear hedging instrument for potential liabilities underlying stock option grants, so repurchases cannot address this form of uncertainty.
Second, the date of option exercise is unknown, although this time is bounded above by the option maturity date and bounded below by any vesting restrictions. So, the date of exercise (if options are in the money) falls in the range of [V,T] , where V is the vesting date and T is the maturity date. Huddart (1994) and Huddart and Lang (1996) present evidence that employee stock options are, on average, exercised early (i.e., well before T). In this analysis, time uncertainty is not an important factor given that the potential hedging instrument is not a derivative contract with a stated expiration date.
The third source of uncertainty is the risk exposure assumed in this paper.
Specifically, the market price of the stock at the time of exercise is unknown at the grant date. 5 If exercise occurs, the firm's shareholders incur an opportunity cost by granting new shares at the exercise price, X, when the market price, S, is greater than X. Buying H% of N shares at the time of option grant may alleviate the uncertainty by "locking in" a market price for shares that may later be issued to satisfy option exercises. As with any "linear" hedge, this strategy creates an ex post opportunity cost (gain) if the realized appreciation on the firm's stock between option grant and exercise dates is less than (greater than) its cost of equity. These commonly cited rationales for hedging are put forth in articles by Bessembinder (1991) , Froot et al. (1993) , Leland (1998) , Mello and Parsons (2000) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , and Stulz (1984) . Froot et al. (1993) , the increased debt hypothesis unambiguously predicts that hedging firms should be more active issuers of debt.
While risk aversion of managers is an unobservable characteristic, the common practice in hedging literature is to examine incentives supplied by the manager's holdings of company stock and options (e.g., Tufano (1996) , Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) , and Rogers (2002)). Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that portfolio holdings providing a linear payoff provide more incentive for managers to engage in hedging. Additionally, from a non-hedging perspective, repurchases increase management's proportionate ownership stake.
On the other hand, if managers are the recipients of new option grants, they may The tax convexity motive does not offer a convincing rationale for hedging stock option grants. 9 Hedging stock option grants by repurchasing stock does not alter a firm's current taxable income. The exercise of stock options reduces its taxable income during the period in which exercise occurs. Nevertheless, the size of this reduction is simply a function of the difference between the market price of the stock at exercise and the option's exercise price. The "hedge" does not impact the firm's taxable income during the exercise period. As such, I do not explore a tax convexity argument in this paper.
IV. Data -Repurchases and Stock Options
The sample is gathered from the population of active firms in the COMPUSTAT (2000)).
For each firm in the sample, I hand-collect the following employee option data from all 10-K filings available on EDGAR: option grants, options exercised, total options outstanding, and total exercisable options outstanding. When possible, I collect the weighted average exercise prices of grants, exercised options, and total options. Options data are most commonly reported with three years of grant, exercise, and cancellation data, so, for example, a firm with filings available back to 1994 may have data available back to 1992.
I also gather executive option data from proxy statement filings on EDGAR. I gather data on the total number of executive options granted to the five highest-paid executives, the total number of options exercised by these executives, the total number of options that are exercisable (i.e., vested), and the total number of options (exercisable and unexercisable).
The repurchase and option data are scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the prior fiscal year. Table 1 shows distributional information. For the sample firm-years, the mean (median) percentage of shares repurchased is 3.83% (2.34%).
Options granted exhibit a distribution of similar magnitude to that of shares repurchased.
The average percentage of options granted is 3.2%, and the median is 1.97%. The magnitude of repurchases as a percentage of option grants displays considerable variation as shown in Table 1 . For example, repurchases as a percentage of option grants exhibit a median of 108.3%, with 25 th and 75 th percentiles of 11.6% and 306%, respectively.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of the repurchases relative to option grants without considering the effect of other motives for repurchasing shares. The use of debt capital provides an alternative mechanism to distribute cash to investors. As financial leverage grows, smaller amounts of cash are available to paid to shareholders. Thus, we expect a negative relation between debt ratio and repurchases.
Following Kahle (2002), I define leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to assets.
Because repurchases may serve as a substitute for dividend payments, I also include the dividend yield as a control variable.
V. Are Option Grants Related to Repurchase Activity?
The first important question posed in the analysis is whether option grants are an important determinant of stock repurchases. Nevertheless, before testing the relation, some significant econometric modeling issues should be mentioned.
A. Econometric Issues
The structure of the sample highlights a couple of important econometric issues that should be addressed initially. First, the dependent variable, shares repurchased, is a variable censored at zero. From 1229 firm-year observations of the repurchase variable shown in Table 1 , 234 (approximately 19%) are zero. In general, ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients are biased and inconsistent in this setting (see Greene (1997) , page 966). The standard approach to addressing this issue is to use a Tobit model. Second, the sample used in this study is a panel of firm-year observations. A primary goal of the analysis is to examine the relation between repurchases and option grants within firms. This objective suggests a fixed effects model may be appropriate.
The two points above produce difficulties in the econometric modeling because estimation of a parametric fixed effects Tobit model yields biased estimates (see Stata
Reference Manual, Release 7, Volume 4, page 474). A random effects Tobit model can be estimated as in Bens et al. (2003) . Unfortunately, a random effects model assumes that any firm-specific effects are constant across firms.
The approach taken in the subsequent analysis is to analyze the data using fixed effects, random effects, and Tobit random effects frameworks. In unreported analysis, I
find statistical evidence from Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests suggesting that fixed effects is a more appropriate model specification than random effects or OLS. Because of its inability to capture within-firm effects, the Tobit model is of limited appeal. The sample selection process may be useful in minimizing the censoring problem, and I find that results are not statistically different between Tobit and OLS models. Therefore, I
report the results of fixed effect regressions for all analyses in which repurchases are the dependent variable. Interestingly, the relation between option grants and repurchases is often not robust to utilizing Tobit and/or random effects specifications. Thus, controlling for the within-firm effects is necessary to capture this relation.
B. Model and Results
The fundamental structure of the model estimated is as follows: Model 1 of Table 2 shows the results from estimation of equation (1) Consistent with the idea firms repurchase stock to hedge option grants, Table 2 illustrates a positive relation between stock repurchase activity and employee option grants. The p-value on the coefficient is 0.07, so the relation is not strongly significant 11 Prior research finds that stock repurchases are negatively related to stock price changes. I investigate this effect by including one-year price percentage changes (both contemporaneous and prior year) in equation (1). These variables have no significant effect on repurchases in a fixed effects model, but I do find that the contemporaneous stock price change is negatively related to repurchases if a random effects model is utilized. In other words, the price change effect is a cross-sectional result, rather than a within-firm result. (2000) and Bens et al. (2003) . Because options granted in the prior year are likely outstanding all year long, these would potentially have a greater dilutive impact on EPS. Thus, firms may repurchase shares to offset these grants.
Alternatively, this relation could be evidence of firms using repurchases to hedge if they sometimes initiate hedges after the exposure occurs. Under a hedging argument, one would expect repurchases to be made approximately at the date of the option grant, but in some cases, firms may delay the hedge (i.e., repurchases) until well after the option grant date. Model 2 of Table 2 shows a coefficient of 0.096 on current year option grants, while the coefficient on lagged option grants is approximately four times smaller. The observed magnitude of the coefficients is more indicative of hedging than anti-dilution.
12 While option grants are modeled as an exogenous variable, there are certainly factors that affect corporate option grant decisions. As a robustness check, I model repurchase activity using a time-series instrumental variables regression in which option grants are treated as an endogenous variable. The additional exogenous variables used in this model are similar to those used in the employee option grant model presented in Core and Guay (2001) . Full details of this model are available from the author. A positive relation between predicted option grants and repurchases is observed in the instrumental variables model, but the coefficient exhibits less statistical significance (p-value = 0.19). Nevertheless, a test for For example, Weisbenner (2000) argues that the relation between option grants and repurchases will be stronger for options granted in the year prior as opposed to current year grants if firms are using repurchases to alleviate the dilution of options. The sum of the two coefficients suggests that, on average, firms repurchase approximately 12% of the shares potentially available under option grants made during the current and prior years. I also check for relations between repurchases with option grants lagged two and three years, but find coefficients of approximately zero on these variables.
In Model 3 of Table 2 , I address the censoring problem by repeating the tests using only observations with non-zero repurchase amounts. 13 The exclusion of the firmyears with no repurchases strengthens the economic significance of the relation between option grants and repurchases. Specifically, the coefficients on current-year and laggedyear option grants are 0.141 and 0.027, respectively. These results suggest that, on average, repurchases of common stock constitute 16.8% of option grants (conditional on positive repurchases) made during the last two years.
In Model 4 of Table 2 , I also address the censoring issue by revising the dependent variable. This regression uses "net" share repurchases by subtracting shares issued through option exercises. The distribution of this variable is not censored. In this model, the coefficient on contemporaneous option grants is approximately 8.5%, and is weakly significant. Lagged option grants exhibit a coefficient of approximately 2.4%.
Overall, the results of this regression imply that earlier results are not a byproduct of model misspecification.
endogeneity (presented in Kennedy (1992) ) suggests that exogeneity of option grants cannot be rejected in the repurchases model.
C. Is the Grant-Repurchase Relation Indicative of Earnings Management?
The positive relation between option grants and stock repurchases may be indicative of a hedging motive. Alternatively, the option variables may measure earnings management incentives from employee options as hypothesized by Bens et al. (2003) .
Specifically, the fully diluted share base incorporates the effects of options and their moneyness on the denominator of the earnings per share (EPS) calculation. Firms may manage change in the share base by repurchasing shares if management believes that income (i.e., the numerator of EPS) may be insufficient to meet EPS targets.
To explore this possibility, I revise the estimation shown in equation (1) Table 3 show the results of equation (1) with the inclusion of NUM_EPS and NUM_POS, respectively, as explanatory variables. The results suggest that earnings management is not an effective explanatory factor of repurchase activity among this sample of firms. The coefficients on both NUM_EPS and NUM_POS are positive, but small, both from a statistical and economic standpoint.
Additional evidence that earnings management is not driving the earlier relation between option grants and repurchases is shown in Model 3 of Table 3 . This regression shows results using the following variables from Bens et al. (2003) in place of option grants, option exercises, and lagged option grants: GRT_DIL, OUTS_DIL (both discussed earlier), and EX_PROC (proceeds from option exercises). The coefficients on GRT_DIL and OUTS_DIL suggest that dilution effects from option grants and total options are not significant factors in explaining stock repurchases. On the other hand, proceeds from option exercises display a positive relation with repurchases. 
VI. Does "Optimal" Risk Management Explain the Relation between Repurchases and Option Grants?
Having documented a positive relation, on average, between repurchases and option grants within the sample firms, the analysis now moves to examining whether firms that repurchase stock in conjunction with option grants are practicing optimal risk management. In other words, do firms displaying this tendency exhibit characteristics that would be expected of hedgers according to risk management theories?
This question is answered through the following general process. First, I identify variables to proxy for the likelihood that firms are using repurchases to hedge option grants. Upon identifying "hedgers", a model is tested to determine whether these firms exhibit financial characteristics consistent with hedging theory.
A. Identification of Option Grant Hedging Proxy Variables
As opposed to much of the empirical hedging literature in which "hedging" firms are selected based on some directly observable variable (i.e., if the firm discloses derivatives usage in its financial statement footnotes), this study can not rely on such direct observation. For purposes of this study, I define two potential proxies for hedging of stock option grants.
The first hedging measure utilizes the volatility of the ratio of shares repurchased to options granted. I examine the univariate relation between these two variables to see how closely they track one another over time. Specifically, for each firm in the sample, I
measure the coefficient of variation for the ratio. For firms with larger coefficients of variation, I place a lower likelihood that option grants are a determining factor of repurchases. In some tests to follow, I define firms with below-median coefficients of variation as "hedging" firms. This cut-off is arbitrarily chosen given that no basis exists for what level of this relation might constitute true hedging behavior.
A second possible measure of option grant hedging is constructed by comparing the fixed effect components across regression specifications with and without the option grant variable (this is referred to as the "fixed effect hedging indicator"). If option grants are a positive factor in explaining the repurchase activity for a particular firm and the option grant variable is omitted from the regression, then the fixed effect coefficient for that firm should include this information. By including the option grant variable, some portion of the fixed effect coefficient will be captured by the positive coefficient on the option grant variable. Thus, I would expect the fixed effect coefficient to decrease after adding the option grant variable to the regression. Thus, I classify all firms that exhibit a decline in their fixed effect coefficients when changing the regression specification from excluding to including option grants as option grant "hedgers." Table 4 repeats the fixed effects regression from Model 2 of Table 2 partitioned across two levels of each option grant hedging proxy variable. The first two models shown in Table 4 utilize the coefficient of variation proxy. Firms with below-median coefficients of variation (1.2166) are more likely to be hedging option grant uncertainty.
This set of firms shows a statistically strong relation between option grants and repurchases. The hedge ratio for this group of firms is approximately 30% (excluding the effect of lagged option grants). Meanwhile, the firms with high coefficients of variation illustrate no significant relation between repurchases and option grants.
The final two models of Table 4 illustrate results of the regressions of repurchases on option grants classified by the fixed effect hedging indicator variable. As seen in the third column, the relation between repurchases and option grants is statistically strong for firms deemed more likely to be hedging, although the economic significance of the coefficient is only about half the size observed using the other hedging proxy variable (0.155 vs. 0.30). Nevertheless, both hedging proxy variables are able to separate sets of firms for which option grants exhibit power to explain stock repurchases. Next, I analyze financial characteristics of the sample firms to assess whether it appears that optimal risk management may explain relations between option grants and repurchases.
B. Is Option Grant Hedging with Repurchases Explained by Optimal Risk Management?
To examine the repurchases-to-grants relation in a hedging context, I utilize the two hedging proxy variables introduced in Section VI.A. These variables form the basis for empirical tests analyzing the characteristics of firms who appear to hedge option grants by repurchasing stock.
In Section III.B, theorized rationales for hedging are discussed. In this section, I
present the results from regressions of the option grant hedging proxy variables on firm characteristics to assess whether option grant hedging conforms to predictions from hedging theory. While the tests utilize a number of independent variables as controls, the variables of particular interest are 1) long-term debt to total assets, 2) net debt issuance to total assets, 3) market-to-book of assets, 4) research and development expense (scaled by total assets), 5) capital expenditures (scaled by total assets), 6) number of shares held by the firm's five highest-paid executive officers (scaled by number of shares outstanding), and 7) number of vested options held by the firm's five highest-paid executives (scaled by shares outstanding). Long-term debt is a common variable used to test financial distress and underinvestment arguments for hedging. Debt issuance is utilized to assess if hedging is associated with more or less reliance on externally provided capital. The next three listed variables are commonly used to analyze underinvestment theories of hedging.
Finally, the last two variables provide measures of managerial motives for hedging. Table 5 presents the means of coefficient results from regressions performed annually for each year from 1994 to 2001. The hedging proxy variables are computed for each firm, thus these are not allowed to vary over time. The first column of Table 5 presents OLS estimates from the regression of the repurchase-to-grant coefficient of variation, while the second column illustrates logit estimates of the fixed effect hedging indicator variable. As in Minton and Schrand (1999) , I assess the statistical significance of the mean coefficients with a z-statistic calculated using the t-statistics from the annual regressions.
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From Table 5 As added evidence of this explanation, I also find weak evidence that debt issuance is negatively related to the hedging variables.
A final result that adds credence to this interpretation is that R&D expenditures show a positive relation with the hedging variables using either proxy. If R&D 15 The calculation is z = t /σ(t)/(N-1) 0.5 , where t and σ(t) are the mean and standard deviation of the annual t-statistics and N is equal to eight (i.e., the number of annual observations from 1994 to 2001).
expenditures proxy for growth opportunities, then this relation is also consistent with the predictions of Froot et al. (1993) . 
VII. Conclusion
Repurchases of common stock are often linked to employee stock option programs, both in the business press and in corporate disclosures regarding repurchase programs. Recently, this link has been confirmed by empirical studies of corporate repurchase behavior relative to direct measures of options outstanding.
In this paper, I extend research of the association between repurchases and employee stock options by studying repurchase activity relative to option grants. Using a sample of firms that, on average, repurchase significant amounts of stock during 1991-2000, I document an economically significant association between repurchases and employee options granted, after controlling for other motives for stock repurchases including firm fixed effects. In fact, it is important for the reader to note that the relation between repurchases and option grants is not apparent if one uses econometric models better suited to capturing cross-sectional relations (i.e., OLS, random effects, etc.).
The finding of a positive relation between repurchases and option grants within firms suggests that some firms may be hedging price risk associated with option grants. I explore this possibility through the use of two different hedging proxy variables. Other than a size effect (large firms are more likely to hedge), the most consistent finding is that firms with lower leverage and higher R&D expenditures are more likely to be hedging option grant uncertainty. By doing so, they are able to rely more on cheaper internal equity to invest in valuable investment opportunities. An alternative hypothesis following from the theory posed by Tufano (1998) Table 2 . Fixed effects regressions -common share repurchases Table 2 shows coefficients from fixed effects regressions on the following independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of common shares repurchased during the fiscal year divided by common shares outstanding at the end of the prior fiscal year. Models 1 and 2 utilize all available firm-year observations. Model 3 uses only firm-year observations in which repurchases are positive. Model 4 uses a revised dependent variable: shares repurchased minus shares issued because of option exercises (scaled by common shares outstanding at prior year-end). P-values are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Table 3 . Relation between repurchases and earnings management variables Table 3 shows coefficients from fixed effects regressions on the following independent variables. The dependent variable is the number of common shares repurchased during the fiscal year divided by common shares outstanding at the end of the prior fiscal year. NUM_EPS represents the number of shares to be repurchased to meet a pre-defined growth target. NUM_POS is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if NUM_EPS is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. GRANT_DIL represents the dilutive effect (on fully diluted shares) of current year option grants. OUTS_DIL is the dilutive effect of total options outstanding. EX_PROC is the dollar amount of option exercises divided by the average market value of the firm's equity. P-values are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Table 4 shows coefficients from fixed effects regressions of the number of shares repurchased (scaled by number of shares outstanding at the end of the prior year) partitioned across two different indicator variables proxying for option grant hedging. In the first two columns, firms are separated into classifications of below and above-median coefficients of variation (CV) of repurchases-to-grants ratios. Firms with "low" CV are more likely to be hedging firms. The third and fourth columns show regressions partitioned based on whether the firm fixed effect coefficient is smaller in a repurchases model (corresponding to Range of Annual R-squared 0.2744 -0.3771 0.5487 -0.8053
